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COMPLEXITIES IN BIOMEDICAL DECISION-
MAKING
George P. Smith, II*
Within the contemporary debate over medical ethics, without question
the most striking weakness found is the lack of a basic yardstick against
which either the "rightness" or "wrongness" of a physician's actions may
be measured. No general agreement is to be found among physicians or
ethicists acknowledging what ethical determinant the physician should or
should not follow in a particular case.372 Yet, despite this conflict of
uncertainties, a framework for principled decisionmaking does exist and
can be found within the rubric of medical ethics.
Medical ethics is the oldest component of bioethics, tracing its
formulations to Hippocrates and the ethical norms of conduct he
articulated for physicians in treating patients. 373 Insofar as medical ethics
relates to specialized facts and concerns, and not because it embodies or
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373 LeRoy Walters, Bioethics as a Field of Ethics, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS
49 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters, eds., 1978). See generally Amy Gutmann &
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appeals to special moral principles or methodology, it may be said to
embody unique standing as a speciality. "It consists of the same moral
principles and rules that we would appeal to, and argue for, in ordinary
circumstances. It is just that in medical ethics these familiar moral rules
are being applied to situations peculiar to the medical world.
3 74
A central focus of medical ethics is directed toward an effort to not
only decide, but to make explicit what those duties are or should be for all
physicians. The particulars will, of course, fluctuate according to different
social structures, differing views of medicine, health, and cure, as well as
different capabilities. 375 In a word, medical ethics is situational. One view
postulates that medical ethics is essentially ordinary ethics--but applied to
medicine. 376 Another view recognizes two elements: dilemma ethics and
virtue ethics. Dilemma ethics concerns itself with the moral rightness or
wrongness of human actions. Virtue ethics refers to the essential moral
formation of the medical practitioner.377 One must be cautious not to
collapse ethics solely into dilemma ethics, for when this occurs, a strange
phenomenon exists: a split between the role of ethics and the person
normally seen.
378
ASPIRATIONAL GOALS
While it has been suggested that the physician's only business is
focusing on the health of his patient, 379 a more balanced contemporary
view, grounded in philosophy and ethics, recognizes the healing
relationship as the architectonic or ordering a principle that shapes and
defines clinical medicine. 380 Indeed, under this view, the phenomenon of
medicine is recognized as a relationship of persons.
381
In structuring any ethics of medicine, the first moral requirement is
competence. What might be properly viewed as the moral center of
medicine occurs when, having considered all the medical actions that can
be done, the physician concludes and proceeds to recommend what ought
374 K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 55 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1989). See generally H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT,
JR., BIOETHICS AND SECULAR HUMANISM: THE SEARCH FOR COMMON MORALITY (1991);
H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATION OF BIOETHICS (2d ed. 1996).
371 Clouser, supra note 3, at 56.
376 See id. at 57.
3 77 RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, THE CRITICAL CALLING 358-59 (1988).
378 See id.
379 Leon R. Kass, Regarding the End of Medicine and the Pursuit of Happiness, 40 PUB.
INT. 11 (1975).
380 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Address at the University of Texas Health Center Grant Taylor
Lecture (1982) (citations available in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Library).
381 See id.
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to be undertaken; or, in other words, what is in the best interest of the
patient.
382
Contemporary medical ethics also imposes an obligation upon the
physician to assist his patient in coping with or adjusting to disease that is
either incurable or progressively debilitating. 383 Although he need not do
this directly, the physician has the major responsibility to supervise or to
employ family, friends or spiritual advisers to this end.384 Thus, utilizing
the healing relationship as medicine's organizing principle means that
moral obligations that go well beyond the simple application of biology to
clinical problems are imposed upon the physician.
385
NORMATIVE AND METAETHICS
There are two main divisions of ethics: normative and metaethics.
Normative ethics focuses upon determining what actions are good or bad,
right or wrong and with related evaluations, such as praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness. Metaethics analyzes the meaning of ethical terms and
also, at another level, structures and assesses criteria for evaluating
competing normative ethical theories.386 Normative ethical theories are
classed as either teleological (consequentialist), or deontological
(formalist).387 The teleologist asserts that there is but one, ultimate right-
making characteristic: namely, "the comparative value (nonmoral) or what
is, probably will be, or is intended to be brought into being." 388 The
centermost deontological principle emphasizes maximizing the balance of
good over evil achieved without any one, ultimate moral criterion.
3 89
Thus, each person and each situation are viewed as unique.
The goal of reaching rational judgments, or those conclusions based on
general applicable principles or universalized maxims, would, at first
blush, appear to play havoc with those espousing moral judgments for
each situation or action. 39 Yet, when one utilizes the immutable first-
order given as the maintenance of purposeful living -- both in the early
potential for life (preconceptionally and prenatally) and its subsequent
382 See id.
383 See id.
384 See id.; see also ERNLE W.D. YOUNG, ALPHA AND OMEGA: ETHICS AT THE FRONTIERS
OF LIFE AND DEATH 16-17 (1989).
385 See generally EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S
GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE TN HEALTH CARE (19 8 8).
386 MICHAEL SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE, BIOETHICS AND LAW 73 (1981).
387 See id. at 80; see also James F. Childress, The Normative Principles of Medical
Ethics, in MEDICAL ETHICS (Robert M. Veatch ed., 1997).
388 See SHAPIRO & SPECE, supra note 15, at 81.
389 See id.
390 See id. at 85.
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continuation and use as a human or fundamental right, there is no
uncertainty of focus at all for the deontologist or situationalist. When the
goal of life is viewed as a quest for total maximization--economic, social,
spiritual, cultural, intellectual or political, this norm is the clear direction
or reference point advanced by the situation ethic. Any action that
challenges this goal, then, is balanced out. In other words, the costs of
changing the course of a present action are balanced against the benefits of
inaction. This balancing mechanism affords a far better opportunity to
achieve the goal of distributive justice than unyielding application of a
theological a priori standard.
THE METAETHICAL QUAGMIRE
Metaethics examines specifically how normative standards should be
structured and what the standards should be for apglying genetic rules of
research and development to future generations. 391 A uniform core of
standards is needed. Individual judgments of scientists, which have proven
faulty and inadequate, 392 should be replaced by an ethic that assures
collective social responsibility. 393 An a priori ethic, which rests on the
faith that certain acts are inherently immoral,394 does not meet this
requirement. A pragmatic ethic, which requires that one make choices that
offer a maximum of desirable consequences, 395 does seem to fulfill the
goal of collective responsibility. If the results of biomedical research will
contribute to human well-being, a practical ethic would sanction the
research.396
Two types of pragmatic ethics exist within the general metaethical
category: rule utilitarianism and case utilitarianism. Rule utilitarians stress
the need for weighing the good that an entire class or category of
experiments, such as reproduction in the laboratory, would produce.397 If
they conclude that the research would not provide sufficient benefits, they
would disapprove the entire class or category of experiments. 391 Case
utilitarians, on the other hand, would weigh the good that each individual
391 See Daniel Callahan, Normative Ethics and Public Morality in the Life Sciences, THE
HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 5, 6; see also RAZIEL ABELSON, ETHICS AND
METAETHICS 4 (1963).
392 See Callahan, supra note 20, at 6.
393 See Eugene B. Brody, Biomedical Innovation, Values, and Anthropological Research,
158 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISORDERS 85-87 (1974).
394 See Joseph Fletcher, New Beginnings in Life: A Theologian's Response, in THE NEW
GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 78 (Michael Hamilton ed., 1972).
395 See Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776,
778 (1971). See generally JOSEPH FLETCHER, COPING WITH GENETIC DISORDERS (1982).
396 See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 81, 86-87. See generally George P. Smith, II,
Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 692 (1976).
397 See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 82; see also SIDNEY ZINK, THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS
93-94 (1962).
398 See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 82.
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case or situation would provide. Under this ethical approach, laboratory
reproduction might be proper in certain cases, but improper in others.
399
Either type of practical ethic is consistent with the need to seek a
consensus ethic to guide biomedical research that is not aligned with
humanism, metarationalism, or assumptions of faith, but is tied solely to a
• 400
communion of shared values derived from observable experiences. No
condemnation of laboratory reproduction would be made pursuant to a
consensus ethic unless either the means or the ends of the research were
incompatible with human needs40 1 or unless a common consent, achieved
through verifiable reasoning, required ending the experiment. 402 One
scholar has suggested that, in the final analysis, reason together with
imagination can produce a "reasonable guess" and that is about all that can
ever be done.
40 3
The creation of life and the remaking of man frame the ultimate ethical
issues resulting from increased genetic knowledge. 40 4  Genetic
modifications are intermediate expressions of this ultimate capacity;
cloning exemplifies the final consequences. To illustrate the issues that an
ethical system must resolve in dealing with biomedical technologies,
consider the consequences of surrogate motherhood.40 5 If sperm donors
have no claim over children born of their sperm through artificial
insemination, an ovum donor should have no superior rights over the real
mother.40 6 When a physician seeks to implant an ovum into another
woman, he should obtain permission from the donor for the transfer or
implant. But, what if the donor woman has strong religious or other
objections to in vitro fertilization that would have led her to refuse
permission if she were told that her ova were to be used for that purpose?
Even if the doctor has obtained permission to use a donor's ova for in vitro
fertilization, what happens if, after fertilization, an embryo begins to
develop abnormally? Who should make the decision to discard or to keep
a defective embryo: the donor woman, the desiring couple, the geneticists,
the obstetrician, or all of these individuals together?0 7 These dilemmas
may be upon us rather quickly. 40
8
399 See id. at 82-83.400 See id. at 88-89.
401 See id. at 89.
402 See id.; see also James M. Gustafson, Basic Ethical Issues in the Bio-Medical Fields,
53 SOUNDINGS 151, 177 (1970).
403 Daniel Callahan, New Beginnings in Life: A Philosopher's Response, in THE NEW
GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 90, 92 (Michael Hamilton ed., 1972).
404 See KENNETH L. VAUX, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 51-52 (1974).
405 See Leon R. Kass, New Beginnings in Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE
OF MAN 1 (Michael Hamilton, ed., 1972).406 See id. at 37-38.
407 See id. at 34-35.
408 See Adam Marshall, Choice for a Child. An Ethical and Legal Analysis of a Failed
Surrogate Birth Contract, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 275 (1996); Glenn McGee, Parenting in
an Era of Genetics, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 16.
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The prospect of producing "optimum babies" introduces another issue
that bioethics must resolve. Many people may raise objections to the
regulation of life beginning in the laboratory, rather than in the home. This
issue forces consideration of the interests of a new participant: the
scientist. For some, this depersonalization of the procreative process is
most undesirable; 40 9 human procreation for them "is more complete
human activity precisely because it engages us bodily and spiritually as
well as rationally."
410
II. THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
VARIATIONS ON A CENTRAL THEME
There are three approaches to bioethical decisionmaking, with the first
being termed, casuistical. 4  Under this form, particular cases are
identified which "represent unquestionably immoral acts. '412 They are
then distinguished "from morally permissible and obligatory acts," 413 with
the overall goal being to settle "cases of conscience" arising under
circumstances where rules are either unclear or in conflict.414 As a genre
of moral inquiry, then, casuistry415 utilizes paradigms and presumptions as
devices to solve real-life moral problems.
416
The second approach to bioethical decisionmaking relies upon agreement
and adoption of a unified theory with derivative rules described otherwise
as a universal or basic public morality to which all rational persons would
espouse.417 The major tension within this approach is the inherent struggle
for seeking both consensus and compromise.
418
Finally, with principalism, the third and strongest approach, metaphors
and analogies are used to either describe or direct actions and relationships
built upon three or four basic principles: autonomy, beneficence and/or
409 See Kass, supra note 34, at 53-54.410 See id. at 53.
411 JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING 1N BIOETHICS 27 (1997) (examining the
approaches by their application to the debate regarding fetal tissue in transplantation
research).412 See id.
413 See id.
414 RICHARD B. MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS: A POETICS OF PRACTICAL
REASONING 4-5 (1996).
415 "Casuistry is defined as '[t]he application of general ethical principles to particular
cases of conscience or conduct."' RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1983).
416 See MILLER, supra note 43, at 5.
417 CHILDRESS, supra note 40, at 29.
418 See id.
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maleficence, and justice.419 The goal of these principles, when applied, is
to provide a structure for the application of moral theory for the
identification and analysis of moral problems in medicine, as well as their
resolution of them.
It is often argued that principles are frequently advanced as a total
replacement for both moral theories and rules arising within the practice
of medicine.42 0 In reality, however, moral principles actually conduce to
ten moral rules for successful or ethical living: do not kill; cause pain;
disable; deprive another of his freedom and his pleasure; deceive; cheat;
disobey the law; fail to keep promises; or fail to live up to a standard of
421duty. Principles are, indeed, drawn from not only laws, but policies and
practices as well.422 They in turn become binding through the application
of rules. 423 When a conflict arises, principles and rules are balanced and
applied, as observed, injudgments.42 4
III. AUTONOMY, BENEFICENCE, AND JUSTICE
There is continuing debate over the dependence or independence of
the three principles of autonomy, beneficence and justice and the role they
play in bioethical decisions. 5 Rather than perceive conflict and
disharmony, however, what should be recognized here is the
complementary focus and blending of all three principles in the ultimate
goal of minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social good.
Thus, autonomy, beneficence, and justice are all balanced against one
another in an effort to maximize the social utility and personal good of an
individual in controversy. Their relationship is inextricable. The state
exists to better life for its citizens and, indeed, each citizen seeks to better
himself by the conferral of positive benefits that, in turn, promote his
personal good. Autonomous, reasonable people thus act accordingly in
undertaking those courses of action designed to advance well-being. Thus,
justice becomes an aspirational codification of the common good.
AUTONOMY
Autonomy, or self-determination, finds its essence and current
expression in the rich and evolving tradition of human rights which, in
turn, has had such a significant impact on Western social and political
419 See id. at 25 (other derivatives are truthfulness, privacy, confidentiality, and fidelity).420 Id. at 30.
4 2 1 [d. at 33.
4 22 Id. at 32.
4 23 Id. at 30-31.
424 Id. at 26; see also Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of the Law, 24
HASTINGS CENTER RPT., July-Aug. 1994, at 16.
425 James M. Gustafson, Basic Ethical Issues in Bio-Medical Ethics, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 73 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1978).
7
Smith: Complexities in Biomedical Decision Making
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 1998
thought over the last four centuries. 426 This newly refined and activated
right of self-determination has fast become the benchmark of the new
patients' rights movement. It is integral, as well, to issues of informed
consent in clinical and research settings, abortion (where the right of
control of one's body is asserted under the rubric of "free choice" 427) and
euthanasia 428 (where the right to die with dignity is asserted429).
Autonomy also applies to a wide range of other health care delivery issues
ranging from allocation of limited resources and regulation of health care
to responsibility for dependent persons.
430
Put directly, "a claim for autonomy is a claim for self-ownership and
self-governance that each person has for his own body or person and the
labor it generates. 431 Some would seek to distinguish between the ideal or
principle of autonomy and the principles of respect for personal
autonomy; the latter obligates a respect for the autonomous choice and the
actions of others.432 It is important for the maintenance of moral life that
individuals be competent, informed, and act voluntarily in their
decisions. 433 First order decisional power, or that power and responsibility
to make decisions regarding the rightness or wrongness of particular
patterns of conduct, may, as a matter of personal choice, be delegated.
Accordingly, an individual may wish to yield to his physician when a
particular medical procedure is proposed, or to his religious institution or
affiliation in matters of sexual ethics.
434
BENEFICENCE
The prevention of harm and the production of good are the two distinct
but relatedfoci of the principle of beneficence. Medical ethics emphasizes
harm prevention under the normative command, "Do no harm."
Accordingly, for the health care professional, this principle means that he
must take care in his actions not to compound an ill patient's condition by
426 Walters, supra note 2, at 51; see also Symposium, Ethics, Bioethics, and Family Law,
1992 UTAH L. REv. 735.
427 Walters, supra note 2, at 51.
421 See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY N HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS (1989).
429 Walers, supra note 2, at 51.
430 Walters, supra note 2, at 50-51.
431 Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL. 713, 727 (1989).
432 James F. Childress, The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics, 20 HASTINGS CENTER RPT.
12 (1990).
433 See id. at 13.
434 See id.; see also Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma, The Conflict Between
Autonomy and Beneficience in Medical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23 (1987); JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982).
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causing or complicating further illness. 435 This beneficence principle is
expanded and applied by bioethicists to their research by adhering to a
standard of concern for the protection of human subjects. It is coupled
with an advance assessment of the possible negative social consequences
which may result from new biomedical technologies in order to protect
large groups of individual from potential harm.4 36 Since biomedical
advances carry significant social costs, it has been argued that society
should be willing to adopt a less permissive and more critical stance
toward new technologies in this field.437
Even though no sharp breaks can be found on the continuum between
"preventing harm" and "producing good," beneficence, as a positive
principle, is regarded as being more directive since it requires conferring
of benefits rather than avoiding harm. In the sense that it allows at least
the risk of some harm in the ultimate course of attempting to produce
great benefits, the positive principle may thus be less stringent than the
negative. Indeed, it is because of the promise of advances in scientific or
medical knowledge or general progress that biomedical research is often
justified.438 In the field of gene experimentation and therapy as well as in
vitro fertilization, advocates of new biomedical and behavioral
technologies contend that the long- term societal benefits accruing from
this technology far outweigh their micro, negative side-effects.
439
JUSTICE
Any use of biotechnology brings with it the ever-present problem of
how to distribute its benefits justly and fairly among various social
groups. 44 Presently, the vast majority of distributional problems are
decided on a local ad hoc basis. Since demand will normally exceed
supply, the threshold question becomes, for example: who should receive
a kidney transplant, artificial heart or be candidates for gene therapy?
What is the fairest principle for distribution: first come, first serve; or
medical compatibility? How equal should access to health care be
recognized as an important social goal? To what extent is there an
inequitable distribution of biomedical research risks to the
institutionalized? And, finally, is it unjust to distribute health care as a free
435 Walters, supra note 2, at 50-51; see Tom L. Beauchamp, The Promise of the
Beneficence Model for Medical Ethics, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 145, 154-55
(1990). See generally Symposium, supra note 54.
436 Walters, supra note 2.
437 Leon R. Kass, The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man's Estate, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 60, 71 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters
eds., 2d ed. 1978); see also Michael D. Kirby, Biomedical Decisions and Opportunity
Costs, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 7 (1986).
438 Kass, supra note 66; see also George P. Smith, II, infra note 87.
439 Walters, supra note 2, at 50-51; see also Russell Scott, Legal Implications and Law
Making in Bioethics and Experimental Medicine, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47
(1985).
440 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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market commodity or to consider the social utility of persons in
distributing scarce medical services? No definitive "answers" can be
postulated.44' Indeed, as Richard McCormick has cautioned, the operative
watchwords should be, "Beware of ethicists bearing solutions!"442 Anyone
claiming to have explicable rules that cut through the philosophical
agonies of ambiguity and uncertainty in our present pluralistic society, is
guilty of deception. 443 All too often, the question of just distribution is
reduced to who shall decide the distribution.
444
Thus, wide social consensus will never be achieved in developing a
framework for resolving difficult medical issues of the new biology,
simply because the criterion of final selection will vary with the nature of
the medical dilemma or particular biomedical technology used. Despite
this lack of consensus, policies that aid in decisionmaking can and must be
advanced. Such a set of policies must be formulated to not only provide
protection for the vulnerable while respecting familial and personal
autonomy and privacy, but to recognize not the centrality of technical
expertise so much as of inherent communal values. Such values foster
humility as well as tolerance and grace.
445
IV. TOWARD A BIOETHICAL RESOLUTION
Human beings will act ideally with rational purpose and design in
addressing the ethical problems of biomedical research. Some urge a
cessation of all research, observing that we lack total knowledge.
446
Significant dangers do exist in undertaking research and in applying the
fruits of that research;447 man often chooses the path of ignorance to
escape the burdens of responsibility that arise from new knowledge. To
end research now, however, will foreclose any opportunity to grow in
wisdom and to use that wisdom to act with dignity and responsibility.
Since man cannot escape responsibility, we should continue research in
441 Kass, supra note 66, at 72; see also Walters, supra note 2, at 50-51.
442 McCormick, supra note 6, at 358.
443 See id.
444 Kass, supra note 66, at 65; see also George P. Smith, II, Our Hearts Were Once
Young and Gay: Health Care Rationing and the Elderly, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & POL'Y 1
(1996).
445 See generally Tom L. Beauchamp, Ethical Theory and Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES iN BIOETHICS 1, 17, 29-31 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th ed.
1994).
446 See Harold P. Green, Genetic Technology: Law and Policy for the Brave New World,
48 IND. L. REV. 559, 576-80 (1973).
447 See Wolfgang Friedmann, Interference with Human Life: Some Jurisprudential
Reflections, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1058, 1076 (1970).
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the new biology and increase the public debate over the social and legal
consequences arising therefrom.
448
Ethics and science interact continuously as the scientific process
creates new possibilities that influence ethical judgments. 449 The set of
values and ordering of commitments to which the scientist ascribes
influences not only the research objectives he seeks, but also the results he
can recognize. 45  Science is descriptive and attempts to resolve the
question: what is? Ethics is prescriptive and attempts to resolve the
question: what ought to be? 451 Paradoxically, the law is charged with
structuring a standard for present behavior and remains simultaneously a
step behind science in a reactive capacity. 452 Exclusive reliance should not
be placed on legal remedies, however, to resolve the complex ethical
problems that biomedical research presents. 453 Similarly, the law should
not embrace nor, indeed, advance one particular scientific ethic over any
other in its problem-solving function.
454
Much of the ethical theory surrounding biomedicine attempts to
harmonize individual desires with the greater social welfare. 455 Moral
dilemmas in biomedicine may be thought of as arising from real or
apparent conflicts between perceived obligations to distant generations
and to the present generation.456 In determining whether continued
investigations into genetic engineering will jeopardize future life, one
should inquire whether an act with uncertain consequences would be
harmful to one's own children.457 Man should not inflict on future
generations that which can be disastrous to a present generation.
458
ACHIEVING STABILITY
Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence that sets it apart as
a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de
448 See, e.g., id. at 1077, George P. Smith, II, Pathways to Immortality in the New
Millenium: Human Responsibility, Theological Direction, or Legal Mandate,15 ST.
LOuIS PUB. L. REV. 447,451-54 (1996).
449 See PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 2-22
(1970).
450 Friedmann, supra note 76, at 1077.
451 Fletcher, supra note 24, at 776.
452 Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 UCLA L. REV.
436, 438 (1968).
453 Frank P. Grad, New Beginnings in Life: A Lawyer's Response, in THE NEW GENETICS
AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 64, 77 (Michael Hamilton ed., 1972).
454 See id.
455 See ALASTAIR V. CAMPBELL, MORAL DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE 1-14 (1972).
456 Martin Golding & Daniel Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future
Generations?, 164 AM. ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 265, 275 (1971).457 See id. at 279.
458 See id. at 279-90. See generally George P. Smith, II, Biotechnology and the Law:
Social Responsibility or Freedom ofScientific Inquiry, 39 MERCER L. REV. 437 (1988)
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facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family
resemblances." While a common thread joining all of the issues is
exceedingly difficult to find, the central core comprising the list of issues,
without question, is a concern over the technology of control of man's
body, his mind and quality of life.459 Many of the concerns of bioethics
relate to public policy--or to legislation, policies and guidelines--at state,
local and federal levels that need to be enacted and enforced with respect
460to all of the issues comprising the de facto set. It has been suggested
that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge
everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils upon which common
agreement exists.
46 1
Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another,
on a broader societal level for moral acceptability to be given, a
democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good
must be promoted though its very promotion causes some degree of harm.
It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is
focused. While individual morality operates primarily within a system of
restraints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where
promotion of goods is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes,
"What goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" Priorities,
values and goods must all necessarily be weighed, balanced and
compared.462 Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of
action are weighed, it is well to remember that those very elements in the
balancing test are based upon value judgments; 463 the penultimate goal is
the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human
suffering and maximizes the social good.464
INITIATING A NEW DEBATE
Bioethics should be viewed as a natural response to not only socio-
politico-religious- medical dilemmas, but to increased knowledge and
threatened rights and not as a new discovery of basic principles. 465 As
419 Clouser, supra note 3, at 62-63; see MAX CHARLESWORTH, LIFE, DEATH, GENES,
AND ETHICS 13-34 (1989). See generally Stephen Wear, The Irreducibly Clinical
Character ofBioethics, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 53 (1991).
460 Clouser, supra note 3, at 63.
461 See generally BIOETHICS (Thomas A. Shannon ed., 1993).
462 See Samuel Gorovitz, Bioethics and Social Responsibility, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
N BIOETHICS 52 (Tom L. Beauchamp et al. eds., 1978).
463 Kirby, supra note 65. See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW,
ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989).
464 George P. Smith, II, Biomedicine and Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De Lege Ferenda, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233, 237 (1993). See generally Carl E. Schneider,
Bioethics in the the Language of the Law, 24 HASTINGS CENTER RPT. 16 (July-Aug.
1994).
461 Clouser, supra note 3, at 54; see Albert R. Jonsen, American Moralism and the Origin
ofBioethics in the United States, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 113 (1991).
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such, bioethics does not require application of a new morality. 466 Morality
is neither invested nor legislated. Rather, it is "discovered" by an
unpacking, explication and articulation of individual intuitions about what
ought be undertaken and what ought not be done.
When new lines of action are discovered, derived rules will then
emerge that, in turn, lead to defined results presenting new conflicts with
basic ethical and moral norms.467 While this process of discovery evolves,
it would be well to promote a new debate on human rights among
members of the legal community as well as scientists, technologists and
philosophers which, in turn, would hopefully guide and shape the whole
process itself.468 Of necessity, the debate will focus its analysis on an
examination of the extent to which the plethora of legal, medical,
scientific, philosophical, and technological considerations combine within
the brave new world to either challenge or complement the more
traditional rights of humanity. Once considered, it will then be necessary
to decide whether a redefinition or reshaping of these rights is needed as a
direct consequence of a set of new contemporary values and standards
emerging from the complex bioethical conundrums of the twenty-first
century. 69 If realized, this debate will then give rise to and promote a
structure for legal coherence to complex bioethical decisionmaking
heretofore absent.
470
466 Clouser, supra note 3, at 62.
467 See, e.g., id.; Michael Kirby, Bioethics '89: Can Democracy Cope?, 18 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 5 (1990).
468 EUGENE B. BRODY, BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-96 (1993).
469 See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, MONOGRAPH, DEVELOPING A STANDARD FOR
ADVANCING GENETIC HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION (1997).
470 See Schneider, supra note 53, at 16. See generally BERNARD GERT, CHARLES M.
CULVER & K. DANNER CLOUSER, BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS (1997).
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